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Comparative advantage. A country has a comparative advantage in a particular good 
if the ratio of costs to produce this good, relative to the cost to produce another good, 
is lower than the same cost ratio in other countries. Comparative advantage is the 
basis for trade: countries gain if they export the good they produce relatively most 
efficient. 
 
Economic growth. Steady increases in GDP.  
 
Energy intensity. Energy supply divided by GDP. 
 
Externality. A situation in which market transactions affect persons who are not 
involved in the transaction directly (i.e. not through market prices).  
 
GDP Gross domestic product. The sum of all output produced by economic activity 
within a country. GNP (gross national product) includes net income from abroad, e.g. 
rent, profits. 
 
General equilibrium. A situation in which all markets in the economy are in 
equilibrium. 
  4
Market equilibrium. A situation, characterized by a certain volume of trade and a 
price of a certain good, such that no market party wants to change behavior: no seller 
of the good wants to increase or decrease supply, no consumers wants reduce or 
increase demand. 
 
OECD countries. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The 
Northern American and Western European countries, Greece, Turkey, and Mexico.  
 
Real price. Relative price of a commodity in terms of another (basket of) 
commodities. GDP is often measured in real prices (also labeled “at constant prices”) 
to eliminate the effects of inflation (where inflation is the upward trend common in all 
prices, leading to a downward trend in the purchasing power of money).  
 
Total factor productivity (also: Multifactor productivity). Outputs per unit of input. 
Changes in total factor productivity measure technological change, by accounting 
how much of the increase in production is due to other factors than changes in inputs. 5
DEFINITION 
Economic growth is the steady increase in output produced by economic activity 
within a country (GDP). A central question is whether economic growth is compatible 
with a non-deteriorating environment and whether the environmental consequences of 
economic growth have a major impact on welfare levels derived from growing output 
of marketed goods. International trade has grown even faster than national income. It 
has been asked whether increased trade has been bad for the environment and whether 
it has caused rich countries to relocate their polluting industries to developing 
countries. Another important question is how large are the costs associated with 
environmental regulation in terms of competitiveness, productivity and employment 
This article deals with these questions by reviewing empirical evidence and economic 
theory on resource use and economic growth.  
 
 
I. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
A. Economic growth and resource use 
  Statistics on national production levels and indicators of environmental 
pressure have been collected the last decades (and reconstructed for the more distant 
past) to document the link between economic growth and the environment. The theory 
of economic growth and economic theories of natural resources provide explanations 
and interpretations of the trends, as well as methods to assess future developments. 
The basic approach in most statistical and theoretical analyses is the decomposition of 
aggregate production of a nation into, on the one hand, the current state of technology 
and, on the other hand, the inputs into the national production process. The main  6
inputs are labor (hours worked), capital (produced means of production that can be 
used over a certain time period), and natural resources.  
Natural resources comprise energy inputs and material inputs. An important 
distinction is between renewable and non-renewable resources. Renewable resources 
are biotic populations, flora and fauna, which have the potential to grow by means of 
natural reproduction. For example, the theory of renewable resources studies fishery 
and forestry. Non-renewable resources are minerals of which physical supplies do not 
grow on a for humans relevant time scale. Examples are metals (like aluminum, 
copper, gold) and fossil fuels (like oil, coal, natural gas).  
The basic characteristic of natural resources is that they cannot be produced, 
but they serve as an essential input in production. A higher rate of resource usage 
implies faster depletion of the available stock of the resource. In this sense resource 
inputs differ in a fundamental way from other inputs used in production such as labor 
and capital: labor is not used up and man-made capital can be accumulated. Another 
important difference is that the available resource stock itself may directly affect 
welfare as an amenity (non-use value). Resource economics studies the trade-off 
between extraction of the resource for current consumption and conservation for later 
dates. Environmental quality can also be considered as an input in the aggregate 
production process.  Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production. Pollution can 
be seen as a degradation of environmental resources, like clean air and soil.  
 
B. Externalities, markets, and incentives 
  Economic growth is the result of growth in inputs and increases in the 
productivity of the inputs – that is, changes in technology. Economics further explains 
why inputs and technology change over time. Inputs like materials, labor and capital  7
are traded in factor markets. Prices match demand and supply and provide consumers 
and suppliers with information and incentives. Population growth, for example, raises 
the potential working force and the supply of labor inputs in the economy rises. This 
fuels growth if wages adjust so that the growing working force is employed in 
production. With more labor in production, capital can be operated at a higher 
productivity level. This increase in the return to capital induces fuels investment in 
new capital so that also growth in capital inputs fuels output growth. Similarly, the 
demand for materials and energy increases. If these are available in limited supply, 
their prices rise, which provides incentives to develop technologies that save on their 
use. Thus while growing scarcity of inputs may itself impose a drag on growth, it may 
also induce technological change which fuels economic growth.  
  Markets provide a powerful coordination mechanism. In sectors of the 
economy where the demand for resources like materials or labor is high, prices rise 
and this attracts resources to these sectors, away from other sectors. Thus resources 
tend to be allocated in those sectors where they are in largest demand. The high 
demand reflects a high willingness to pay for the resources and implies that their 
value is considered to be large. This explains why the market mechanism in principle 
can enhance efficiency and welfare in the economy.   
The market can only coordinate social preferences (demand for certain goods 
or services) and (technical) possibilities and resource endowments in a welfare-
maximizing way, if prices reflect these preferences and possibilities. This requires, 
first, that the owners of production factors (the inputs like labor, capital and materials) 
can charge a price that reflects their production cost, and, second, that consumers can 
express their willingness to pay. For many environmental goods, these preconditions 
are not met. In the absence of environmental regulation, there are no markets for clean  8
air or climate. Pollution entails a cost to society, but not a cost to the polluting 
producers. Waste can be disposed freely, but imposes a cost on society. When 
economic activity – that is, a market transactions – imposes costs or benefits on 
persons who are not involved in the transaction directly, externalities are said to be 
present. Externalities cause markets to function imperfectly and welfare to be 
impaired. This is why environmental policies may improve welfare. These policies 
have to correct environmental externalities, for example by making firms pay for the 
pollution costs they impose on society.  
We can now be more precise to define the cost of pollution for society. From 
an economic perspective, pollution (and, similarly, environmental degradation or 
resource depletion) is costly to the degree that it causes externalities. Because the 
value of environmental quality is not reflected in the prices in the economy, the 
economic decisions that are based on these prices give rise to more pollution than 
society finds optimal.  
The ideal (optimal) environmental regulation imposes measures to eliminate 
all external costs of pollution, that is, it makes all parties in society internalize all 
social costs of pollution. In such a situation, welfare is maximal, but pollution is not 
necessarily (and very unlikely) at the technical minimum. Although depletion of 
natural resources and polluting consequences of production are by definition bad for 
the environment, they are not necessarily bad for welfare. They provide the inputs for 
production of valuable things. As long as the benefits from increases in production 
outweigh the costs of environmental degradation, economic growth enhances welfare.  
In the remaining sections of this article, we study how economic growth, 
international trade, and environmental regulation affect the environment and welfare. 
To examine the impact on aggregate welfare, changes in the physical state of the  9
environment have to be made comparable to changes in economic production, which 
requires a valuation method to put values on environmental improvements. Since this 
is not only a hard, but also subjective task, we also look at the physical effects, by 
which I mean the impact on pollution, pollution concentration and resource stocks 
measured in physical terms. This is the conservationist perspective, to be contrasted 
with the economic approach that deals with welfare effects.  
 
 
II. TRENDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND RESOURCE USE 
 
A. Trends in economic growth 
In the period between 1820 and 1995, total world production (GDP) has 
grown on average at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent, which amounts to a more than 40 
fold increase over a mere 175 years. This rate of change is unprecedented: in the 1800 
years before this period world GDP increased less than 7 fold. Per capita economic 
growth has been enormous also the last century. With current world population at 
about 5.5 billion, 5 times as big as in 1820, per capita GDP is now almost 8 times 
bigger than it was 175 years ago.  
Differences among countries are large. In 1988, output per worker in the US 
was more than 30 times higher than output in Subsahara Africa. Developing countries 
often have per capita income levels that are less than 10 per cent of US levels (e.g. 
India 9 per cent, China 6 per cent, in 1988). Per capita income in Western Europe is 
on average 30 per cent lower than in North America, but income gaps are now smaller 
than four decades ago. Typically, among the richer countries, there is convergence in 
income levels, while the gap between the poorest and richest countries still grows.  10
 
B. Trends in energy and materials  
Economic growth directly translates into growing demand for energy 
resources and materials, since they are necessary inputs in production. However, in 
the process of growth, some energy resources or materials may be substituted for 
others so that not all of them are used at an increasing rate. Technological change has 
allowed many sectors of the economy or even entire economies to produce at a lower 
overall energy intensity.  
Primary energy supply in the OECD countries was roughly 50 percent higher 
in 1999 than in 1971, but GDP rose faster. Indeed, from 1960-2000, energy use is 
decoupled from economic growth, at least in the EU, Japan and the US (at annual 
rates of 0.4, 0.2 and 1.4 per cent, respectively). The oil shortages in the 1970s induced 
energy conservation programs. Also the growing relative importance of services 
relative to manufacturing caused energy efficiency to rise. In recent years, growth in 
energy use has accelerated due to increased transport and electricity use in service 
sectors. Trends in materials use vary considerably over different materials. Iron and 
steel have grown slower than GDP, paper use has grown in line with GDP, but 
plastics and aluminum have grown faster than GDP.  
The concern is that growing energy and materials use results in scarcity of 
resources and imposes a threat to future growth. Stocks of virgin ores decline. The 
stock of materials embedded in products grows, leaving less available for recycling. If 
growth fuels demand for resources and supply becomes smaller, prices can be 
expected to rise. Yet, most price indicators do not reflect growing scarcity. The prices 
of most commodities have declined since 1960. Here, prices are measured in real 
terms, i.e. relative to the prices of a representative basket of produced goods. Most  11
economists have concluded that resource scarcity will not limit growth, at least not 
during the coming decades and not if we consider scarcity of those resources that are 
traded in well-developed global markets, like most minerals and energy resources. 
Falling prices may reflect technological progress, which allows mining at 
lower cost, or exploration of new resource deposits. According to most economic 
theories, this is likely to be a temporary phenomenon and in the long run prices of 
non-renewable resources are expected to rise over time. This does not necessarily 
imply, however, that future growth will no longer be fuelled by lower costs of energy 
and materials, since technological change, as well as exploration and development of 
new economically useful resources, may overcome scarcity limits.  
The growing use of certain energy resources and materials has severe impacts 
on the natural environment. In general, economists agree that free market forces do 
not serve very well society’s demand for environmental amenities or conservation of 
natural resources for which markets are illegal, incomplete, or do not exist (like water 
and air quality, rare species, biodiversity, ecosystem services). Emissions of CO2 from 
fossil fuel combustion pose major threats to air pollution and climate. Despite the 
decoupling of energy use from economic growth in the developed economies and 
despite the decline in the carbon content per unit of energy used, total CO2 emissions 
have risen in almost all countries in the last decades. In large developing countries 
like India, China and Brazil, absolute CO2 emissions have risen very rapidly. In 
contrast to the OECD experience, their CO2 emissions per unit of GDP have risen at 
fast rates (up to 2.6 percent per year, in India 1971-1998).  
Other major threats to the environment come from the use of hazardous 
industrial waste, emissions and toxic chemicals, which are used in the production 
process and discarded as some form of industrial waste. As a result of environmental  12
regulation, emissions from production activities (industry) have actually declined. 
However, waste and emissions from consumption activities are growing. Municipal 
waste and hazardous waste have increased in recent decades in developed countries, 
at a rate faster than population and faster than GDP.  
 
C. Cross country differences in resource intensities 
Differences in energy used per unit of GDP are large. In Northern America per 
capita energy use is more than twice per capita energy use in Japan, France or UK and 
about 1.5 times that in Germany and Australia. The differences mainly arise because 
of differences in per capita income and differences in energy used per unit of output. 
Differences in the structure of production (in terms of the relative importance of 
industrial production sectors) are hardly responsible for the differences in per capita 
energy use.  
 
 
III. EXPLANING THE LINK BETWEEN GROWTH AND RESOURCE USE 
 
A. The environment – income relationship  
Economists have tried to identify underlying mechanisms in resource use and 
growth trends. A central question is how environmental pressure changes with 
economic growth. One hypothesis is the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) hypothesis, according to which environmental pressure or resource use first 
increases with GDP, but – after a certain threshold income level – declines with per 
capita GDP. The hypothesis has been tested for several resources, energy sources and  13
emissions. The evidence is mixed: the EKC shows up, but only for some pollutants 
and not in all countries.  
In the typical approach, pollution in the major cities (or other measurement 
stations) of a set of countries is compared and related to the level of income in these 
cities. If pollution rises with the level of income but also declines with the square of 
the level of income, the EKC holds.  
The EKC is found for water pollutants and for air pollutants like SO2, 
suspended particulate matter (dark matter as well as heavy particles), NOx and CO. 
These pollutants cause health problems close to the place where they are emitted (i.e. 
these are local pollutants), while their impact occurs simultaneous with emissions (i.e. 
these are short-lived or flow pollutants). The EKC is generally rejected for municipal 
waste, CO2 and aggregate energy consumption: these variables monotonically 
increase with the level of income in a cross-section of countries. Since it is the 
accumulation of municipal waste in landfills – rather than the annual flow – that 
imposes environmental pressure, it is a stock pollutant. CO2 is partly a local flow 
pollutant, but its main impact is through concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere on 
the global climate (i.e. it is a global pollutant as well as a stock pollutant). Other 
evidence on the main global stock pollutants and environmental indicators is only 
indirect. For example, wilderness land is monotonically declining with the level of 
income, which is a crude measure of the negative relation between income and 
biodiversity loss.  
 
B. The role of environmental regulation 
Thus, the common pattern is that local pollutants and flow pollutants are more 
likely to first rise and then fall with income than global pollutants or stock pollutants.  14
The main driving force behind the lower pollution levels in richer countries decline is 
policies to reduce pollution. In richer countries, citizens are willing to pay more for 
improvements in environmental quality and succeed in convincing their local and 
national governments to impose the necessary regulation to reduce urgent pollution 
problems. Since the effect of reducing local flow pollutants has the most visible 
effects for the constituencies of the local authorities, regulation mainly aims at these 
rather than at global or stock pollutants. The latter affect other regions or future 
generations, respectively, but not so much the authorities’ electorate. In this 
interpretation, environmental improvement only occurs when environmental 
regulation becomes more stringent in richer economies. That is, environmental 
problems are not solved “automatically” by economic growth. Growth will be 
accompanied by reductions in pollution only if a number of conditions is fulfilled.  
First, when becoming richer, people must care more about environmental 
quality. There is no strong evidence in favor of this claim. For example, in developing 
countries, environmental quality and availability of natural resources is often much 
more crucial for households than in developed countries. Yet, within developed 
countries, willingness to pay for improvements in health rise with income. As a result, 
richer citizens may be more in favor of costly measures to reduce pollutants with 
direct health impacts.  
Second, only if the costs of reducing pollution do not rise too much with 
national income, citizens vote for pollution reduction. Technological change is 
important in this respect. On the one hand, cleaner production processes have been 
developed, which mitigates the cost of pollution reduction. On the other hand, some 
new production processes and the production of new goods require more energy and 
resource use. For example, the rapid spread of computers and the growing demand for  15
transport makes the economies heavily dependent on electricity and fossil fuels so that 
reductions in energy use have a big cost in terms of loss of production. This may 
explain why electricity and fossil fuels use does not decline with income, despite 
concern about the environment.  
Third, actual environmental policies need to reflect societies preferences for 
environmental quality. Indeed, in countries with relatively high degree of political and 
civil freedom, environmental problems decline more rapidly with income. In countries 
with high indicators of corruption, natural resource depletion is faster.   
Pollutants differ in terms of their (health) impact, the degree to which they are 
local and short-lived, and the cost of reduction. As a result, when comparing 
emissions of different pollutants in a particular country, some may rise and others 
may fall with income. That is, the Kuznets curves – if they exist at all for the 
pollutants at hand – overlap. It implies that while environmental quality improves on 
account of the reduction in one pollutant, aggregate measures of environmental 
quality may deteriorate because this pollutant is replaced by other pollutants. This 
may be a problem in particular since stock pollutants replace short-lived pollutants, 
which amounts to a shift of the environmental burden to future generations. Similarly, 
Kuznets curves of different countries overlap. While rich countries reduce emissions 
of a certain pollutant, poor countries may at the same time increase emissions in their 
growth process. Thus, pollution is shifted from rich to poor places. As a result, the 
existence of an EKC for a certain pollutant does not guarantee that worldwide 
environmental quality improves over time. This phenomenon is particularly important 
because the poor countries, which tend to increase emissions with production, account 
for a much larger share in the world economy than the rich one and some of them are 
growing at above-average rates (notably China).   16
 
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
  A. The pollution haven hypothesis 
The evidence on the EKC points out that national environmental policies 
differ between high-income and low-income countries and that as a result of income 
growth pollution in the North may be reduced over time at the cost of increasing 
pollution in the South. There have been concerns that this process is reinforced by 
international trade of goods and by foreign direct investment between North and 
South. More stringent environmental policies in the North force pollution-intensive 
industries located in the North to raise their prices relative to the prices charged by 
firms in the South. Consumers in the North may then profitably import more goods 
from the South and firms in the North may profitable relocate their plants to the 
South. This claim on the effects of differences in stringency of environmental 
regulation is labeled the “pollution haven hypothesis”.  
  Empirical evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis is not very strong. The 
hypothesis has been tested in various (mainly indirect) ways. Typically, in a first step 
polluting industries are identified, based on their emissions per unit (dollar) of output, 
or pollution control costs as a fraction of value added. At the top of these rankings we 
find industries like iron and steel, nonferrous metals, mining, pulp and paper, 
industrial chemicals, petroleum refineries, rubber and leather products. In a second 
step, the performance of these sectors in different countries is related to the country’s 
environmental stringency, controlling as much as possible for other country  17
differences. Stringency is either measured as an index based on law and regulation, or 
a measure of pollution control expenditures.  
Within the US, polluting industries tend to export smaller volumes, start fewer 
new plants, and attract less investment in states with more stringent environmental 
regulation than in states with more lenient environmental regulation. Among different 
countries, the effects of differences in environmental regulations are harder to trace. 
Overall, industrial countries have reduced their share in world trade of goods from 
polluting industries relative to developing countries over the last decades. However, 
there is no evidence that this trend is mainly due to differences in environmental 
regulation or due to international trade. The pattern of growth in these countries may 
be caused by a shift to pollution-intensive industries (as a movement along the 
upward sloping part of the EKC). Moreover, the industrial countries remain the 
largest exporters in the most polluting industries. Hence, we must reject the claim that 
internationally most pollution is created in countries with lax environmental 
standards. The main explanation behind this finding is that other factors than 
environmental regulation are much more decisive in determining production cost or 
location advantages. The share of compliance costs for environmental regulation in 
total cost is small relative to the cost savings that can be gained from the availability 
of skilled workers able operate advanced technologies, access to large consumer 
markets, and political stability. Polluting industries sometimes have high transport 
costs so that proximity to consumer markets is important. Polluting industries are also 
typically capital-intensive and operated by skilled workers. These factors make 
developed countries a more attractive location for polluting industries. Hence, 
differences between North and South in availability (that is, endowments) of capital 
and skilled workers offset the differences in environmental regulation.   18
 
  B. Is trade beneficial? 
For given differences in endowments of capital and labor, relatively lax 
environmental regulation in some countries, in particular the poorer ones, is likely to 
shift some of the dirty industries to the South. The question is whether this is always 
undesirable. According a standard economic argument, there may be mutual benefits 
from relocation of pollution intensive industries between different countries. For 
example, countries with low income but enough space to keep away pollution from its 
population may be willing to accept pollution if this can greatly boost income. High-
income countries with high population density care less about increases in income if it 
comes at the cost of pollution problems. In this case, both types of countries benefit if 
pollution is relocated from high-income to low-income countries.  
While lax environmental policies in the South seem to burden citizens in the 
South with pollution havens, workers in the North may be concerned about the 
stringent environmental policies in their countries. The North loses jobs in pollution-
intensive industries and export performance in these sectors falls when these 
industries move to the South. However, at the same time, trade with the South allows 
the North to improve performance in clean industries, so that again trade creates 
mutual benefits for North and South (although these benefits may come only after 
some time-consuming – and therefore costly – adjustments in the economy). Indeed, 
if the North would not be engaged in trade with the South, environmental regulation 
would also result in job losses in polluting industries and shifts to clean industries, but 
it would forego the benefits from importing and consuming goods that can be 
produced at lower costs in other countries and it would forego the opportunity to earn  19
a living by exporting goods that can be produced at a comparative advantage in the 
North.  
In general, differences in environmental regulation may reflect differences in 
social costs to deal with pollution and form a true basis for mutually beneficial trade. 
However, if national environmental regulation ignores the average citizen’s 
preference for pollution and fails to reflect the social costs of pollution, trade is no 
longer always mutually beneficial. This is why large multinational corporations have 
been criticized when they negotiate concessions with elite governments and exploit 
their monopoly power. However, hard evidence on unbalanced benefits and costs 
from the activities of such firms is not available.  
Other situations where trade not necessarily leads to mutual gains occur when 
pollution is transboundary, that is when pollution from one country harms citizens of 
other countries. Since national governments are not likely to take into account these 
pollution spillover effects, they tend to set pollution regulation too lax. For all 
countries to gain from trade, environmental regulation in each country should reflect 
the cost of pollution not just to own citizens, but to the world community as a whole. 
Thus, when SO2 emissions in UK hardly affect British citizens but cause forests in 
Scandinavia to die, the UK may be tempted to impose lax regulation of SO2 
emissions, thus creating a comparative advantage in SO2-intensive goods and 
boosting export of these goods. This trade would harm Scandinavia.  
A final situation of harmful international trade may arise when countries have 
strategic reasons to set overly-lax or overly-stringent environmental policies. Some 
environmentalists have feared that governments set environmental policies overly lax. 
Governments may have an incentive to accept environmental standards that are lower 
than is socially desirable, in order to attract foreign direct investment or give domestic  20
industry a cost advantage over foreign firms, and thus make higher profits. (This has 
been labeled “ecological dumping”). However, if many governments try to protect 
their polluting industries in this way, they may all fail in a “race to the bottom”: the 
lax standard in one country is offset by the response in the other country to also lower 
environmental regulation. Only if firms’ location choices and cost levels are 
sufficiently responsive to differences in environmental standards, national 
governments can use environmental policies as a strategic instrument against other 
countries. In the past, the lack of strong evidence for pollution havens has been 
interpreted as evidence against significant firm responses to environmental stringency 
and the fear for strategic use of environmental policy seemed ungrounded. Recently, 
however, evidence of firm responses become stronger so that strategic environmental 
may still be reasons for concern.  
 
C. Is trade good for the environment? 
  Although we have no hard evidence on the magnitude of the net benefits (or 
costs) of trade in polluting goods, and there is no strong evidence on large effects of 
environmental regulation on trade and foreign direct investment, we have some 
detailed analyses of the effects an increase in world trade has on pollution in different 
countries. Trade has significant effects on pollution, but often more trade implies a 
cleaner environment.  
  World trade has intensified enormously the last decades. Between 1973 and 
1998, world merchandise exports and global foreign direct investment have grown at 
annual rates of 9 and 14 per cent respectively. This expansion of trade cannot be held 
responsible for increases in world pollution. The share of dirty products in world trade 
has declined. Comparing open economies (countries with high shares of exports and  21
imports in GDP) to closed economies (countries with little foreign trade), statistical 
analysis shows that open economies have less pollution per unit of GDP (other things 
equal). Open economies tend to adopt clean technologies more rapidly.  
  Trade often has a beneficial impact on the environment because of the 
interaction between comparative advantages and adjustment of environmental 
regulation. High-income countries tend to have higher environmental standards. High 
income countries can also, however, produce pollution-intensive (which are often 
skilled-labor or capital-intensive) products at a relatively low cost thanks to access to 
advanced technology, and large endowments of skilled labor and capital. It implies 
that high-income countries have a comparative advantage in producing pollution-
intensive goods. When they liberalize trade, they tend to export more of these goods. 
Thus, world trade becomes greener since trade shifts production of polluting goods to 
countries where environmental standards are higher. Moreover, international trade 
increases income, which leads to a policy response since richer countries tend to 
impose more stringent environmental regulation. Thus, also countries with lower 
incomes tighten their environmental regulation. Multinational firms adopt 
environmental practices overseas that are (partly) determined by environmental 
regulations in their home countries, under pressure of consumer actions and for fear of 
loss of reputation.  
  Although evidence on an aggregate level suggests that international trade is 
benign to the environment, in certain areas trade has serious adverse impact on the 
environment. Certain types of pollution or natural resource use remain unregulated 
and it is in these areas that trade give rise to concerns. A first example is transport. 
The growth in world trade has been accompanied with increases in transport 
movements, which are heavily energy-intensive. The pollution costs (externalities)  22
associated with transport are not fully reflected in regulation so that welfare losses 
and excessive pollution may stem from the increase in transport. Since the costs of 
transport cross borders, appropriate policies require international coordination, which 
is often hard to establish. Secondly, transport involves the problem of invasive 
species: the accidental or intentional introduction of harmful non-indigenous species 
of plants and animals can damage environmental resources. The cost of screening and 
quarantines is often prohibitive. Thirdly, the concentration of agriculture in certain 
locations without appropriate regulation puts stress on biological diversity with 
potential loss of soil quality in larger regions in the longer run. It destroys habitat of 
species and may lead to extinction of theses species and loss of biodiversity.  
 
 
V. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
  A. The cost of environmental regulation 
Environmental regulation aims at improving environmental quality but may 
come at the cost of jobs, productivity, or other undesirable economic effects. To 
justify environmental regulation on economic grounds, it should be shown in a cost-
benefit analysis whether the benefits are large enough to incur the costs. In some 
cases, the costs are found to be small or even negative, that is, there are benefits to be 
reaped not only in terms of environmental improvement but also in other fields. 
Estimates of the total costs of environmental regulation vary enormously between 
different studies. 
  The traditional argument is that environmental regulation imposes costs on 
firms as well as governments and consumers. Governments incur costs of  23
administration of the regulation. Firms are burdened with costs because, first, they 
have to install and operate pollution control equipment, intensify monitoring, and face 
higher administrative burdens. Second, under certain types of regulation, they may 
face pollution charges, expenditures on buying pollution permits or quotas, or fines in 
so far they emit more than the quotas that are allocated to them. Third, depending on 
the degree that they pass through costs to prices, they see demand for their output fall 
and suffer from lower profits.  
The total burden on polluting firms depends much on firm characteristics and 
the employed technology. Estimates of direct costs of complying with environmental 
regulation vary from less than one percent of GDP in 1972 to more than 2.5 percent at 
the end of the 1990s in the US and slightly lower figures in Western Europe. Across 
industries, petroleum and coal industries faced pollution control capital expenditures 
up to one quarter of total capital expenditures, while for industries in rubber and 
plastics production the number was only 2 per cent.  
More crucial from an economic perspective is that the burden of regulation 
depends on the design of the regulation; in particular on the flexibility firms have to 
choose their own way to comply with the regulation. At the one extreme, the regulator 
prescribes the technology the firm has to use or the pollution control actions it has to 
take, leaving little flexibility to the firms. At the other extreme, the regulator allows 
firms to emit up to a specified emissions allowance and leaves it to the firm’s 
discretion by what means to reduce emissions as well as whether to trade pollution 
allowances with other firms (system of marketable pollution permits). Compared to 
the former type of regulation (the command-and-control approach), the latter type of 
regulation (the market-based approach) minimizes the costs of regulation. First, it 
allows firms to choose the cheapest way to reduce emissions. Profit-maximizing firms  24
will have an incentive to do so. Second, it gives incentives to firms that can reduce 
emissions at lowest cost to do most of the reduction and sell their pollution 
allowances to other firms. Thus, total pollution control costs are minimized. 
Alternative market-based instruments are charges (taxes) proportional to emissions.  
Up to now, market-based instruments have been applied less frequently than 
command and control instruments, but their importance grows. Successes with 
marketable permits have been established with respect to reductions of lead content in 
petrol, air pollutants and sulphur dioxide emissions in particular. Estimates of the cost 
savings potential of moving from command-and-control to market-based instruments 
range from 50 to 90 percent.  
Sometimes regulated firms find zero cost options to comply with more 
stringent environmental regulation, or even make profits out of it. Case studies have 
documented situations in which the reductions of materials or toxic chemical use for 
environmental reasons saved enough on the firm’s expenditures on inputs to easily 
pay back the investment cost of adjusting the production process. Even without 
environmental regulation, the investment would have been justified, since it allowed 
for a real efficiency improvement.  
It is unlikely that these situations systematically arise, since managers of firms 
are supposed to look for opportunities to improve efficiency and exploit them even 
without intervention by environmental regulators. Thus, when firms maximize profits 
and regulation constrains their choice of technologies, the smaller choice menu must 
lead to fewer opportunities to operate at certain profit levels and regulation is costly. 
This conclusion is unlikely to change if we acknowledge the limits to profit 
maximization because of informational and managerial problems. No doubt, 
inefficiencies in firms’ production processes and organization remain pervasive, since  25
managers’ span of control is insufficient to assess and eliminate all of them. Because 
of the small share of environment-related costs, managers may systematically ignore 
environment-related inefficiencies. Then, environmental regulation may make 
managers more focused on cost savings potentials related to pollutants and materials 
use. However, it may come at a cost by turning away their attention from other 
inefficiencies so that on balance it is unlikely that environmental regulation can 
systematically – that is, economy-wide –improve overall efficiency.  
Opportunities for cost savings have been explored by engineering, or “bottom-
up”, studies. These studies start from an emissions reduction target for the economy 
as a whole and then identify all the technological measures by which this target can be 
achieved. For each of them, the researcher estimates the cost incurred by firms and 
adds these up to an economy-wide total. Often the numbers are surprisingly low, 
suggesting that technological opportunities abound to improve the environment at low 
cost. The problem with these studies is that many hidden costs are ignored. Adoption 
of new technologies will not only change firms’ emissions, but also product 
characteristics and quality, employment structure, and input demand. It requires 
adjustments beyond the simple installation of pollution control equipment. The entire 
production and marketing process may be affected.  
The alternative method to assess pollution control costs, sometimes labeled the 
“top-down” approach, starts from a statistical (and econometric) analysis of the 
relationship between production costs and environmental regulation, and between 
emissions and regulation across industries. The statistical results are used to make a 
projection how costs are affected by a hypothetical change in emissions, which 
corresponds to the policy target. This requires building a stylized model of the entire 
economy, which involves the incorporation of many assumptions and additional  26
statistical results on how markets work and react to policy changes. These “top-down” 
studies suggest much higher costs of environmental policy than bottom-up studies. 
Hence, adjustment costs are substantial. A drawback of this method is that it 
necessarily relies on historical data on firms’ reactions to regulation and that it cannot 
incorporate the details of available new technologies to meet the environmental target. 
The results are also quite sensitive to the modeling structure and assumptions made.  
Econometric techniques have also been used to estimate the effects of 
environmental regulation on employment. One would expect to find a negative 
correlation between stringency of environmental regulation and employment changes 
in pollution-intensive industries. Most studies find small effects when relating 
environmental regulation across US states to employment. Often the correlation 
between employment in dirty industries and environmental regulation is even 
positive. The main explanation is that we should not expect a causal relation from 
environmental stringency to employment, but rather view both employment and 
regulation as being determined simultaneously by economic and political factors. 
States with a strong economy, high productivity of their industries and high income 
can afford –and may actually prefer – more stringent regulations than poorer states; at 
the same time the former states may experience strong employment growth as a result 
of the favorable economic conditions.  
 
B. General equilibrium effects 
To assess the over-all costs of environmental regulation, we have to measure 
not only how it directly imposes costs on a regulator and regulated firms, but also how 
it affects other items on the government’s budget and how it affects customers and 
suppliers of regulated firms. Almost all activities in the economy are linked to each  27
other: a consumer buys goods from firms and gets her income from (another) firms, 
pays taxes to governments, which subsidize firms and provide infrastructural goods 
for firms. Hence, regulating certain firms may affect the entire economy through these 
linkages. Such indirect effects are labeled general equilibrium effects, as they reflect 
the effects after all markets in the economy have reacted and adjusted such that a new 
equilibrium in the economy as a whole results.   
  The linkages between economic activities may sometimes mitigate the cost of 
environmental regulation, and sometimes reinforce them. When regulated firms have 
cut back their polluting activities, they buy less from their suppliers and these 
experience loss in sales, too. However, other firms may gain. Regulated firms may 
need to buy specialized equipment to control pollution, so firms selling this 
equipment gain. When regulated firms pass on their higher costs into higher prices, 
their customers switch to other producers. Hence, firms likely to gain from regulation 
are those that supply goods that customers view as a suitable substitute for the 
regulated firms’ goods.  
  The overall cost of environmental regulation is the sum of all gains and losses. 
The indirect gains are not likely to fully offset the direct costs for one obvious reason. 
Regulation aims at reducing pollution, and this requires reductions in polluting inputs. 
If the economy as a whole has to cut back on inputs, total output is likely to fall, too. 
This effect may be reinforced over time, through effects on investment. Investment in 
new capital goods fuels growth in the economy. The return to investment is likely to 
be smaller if new capital goods have to be run with less energy or polluting inputs, so 
that the incentive to invest is crowded out through more stringent environmental 
regulation. Thus growth may be impaired by environmental regulation.   28
  The economy-wide impact of environmental regulations can only be estimated  
– rather than directly measured – since we cannot observe how the economy would 
have evolved in the absence of the regulation. Estimates therefore heavily depend on 
the model that is used for the estimation. Based on standard macroeconomic or 
growth-theoretic models, estimates of the total cost are in the same order of 
magnitude as the direct pollution control costs, about two percent of GDP. Some 
researchers have noticed that the surge in regulatory costs coincides with the growth 
slowdown in the 1970s. Yet, all calculations show that only a very small portion of 
the slowdown can be attributed to environmental regulation.  
 
C. In search of “Double Dividends” 
Despite the fact that environmental regulation amounts to restricting inputs in 
the economy and is therefore likely to reduce output, counterarguments have been 
advanced that environmental regulation may bring about large gains. The key 
argument is that environmental policy shifts economic activity away from polluting 
sectors to other sectors in which the contribution of economic activity to welfare is 
larger. Hence, while regulation forces the economy to cut polluting inputs, it may 
raise total output by improving the average efficiency at which inputs are employed. 
  
  1. Removal of inefficient subsidy and tax programs 
Efficiency gains can arise from environmental regulation if efficiency differs between 
sectors, in particular if efficiency in polluting sectors is lower than in clean sectors. 
Normally, differences in efficiency are competed away by market forces, but (non-
environmental) regulation may distort these market forces and create sectors where 
resources are inefficiently used. Important examples are agriculture and energy. In the  29
OECD agricultural output is heavily subsidized so that high-cost/low-productivity 
agricultural activities in these countries remain viable. This support creates 
inefficiencies and the tax revenue could be better spent from an efficiency point of 
view. The widespread use of energy subsidies to firms also creates support for low 
productivity energy-intensive production. If these subsidies are abolished and 
replaced by environmental regulation that reflects, for example, the adverse impacts 
of pesticide on soil and water quality or those of energy use on world climate, 
efficiency gains can be large by shifting economic activity away from inefficient 
farming and energy-intensive industries.  
  
2. Environmental tax reform 
Gains from environmental regulations have also been claimed to be feasible 
when they can be combined with reductions in certain taxes. On the one hand, 
governments have relied on taxes on labor and capital to fund their budgets. These 
taxes may reduce the incentive to participate in the labor market or to invest in capital, 
so that the taxes distort markets and create inefficiently low levels of employment and 
investment. On the other hand, environmental taxes (charges on emissions, auctioning 
off of pollution permits) not only give incentive to address environmental problems 
but also raise revenue.  
Indeed, the first important insight from the theory of public finance theory is 
that it is better to “recycle” the revenues from environmental taxes through reductions 
in distortionary taxes than to use them to fund the general government budget. 
However, the second insight is that replacing distortionary taxes on labor and capital 
by revenue-raising environmental taxes will reduce the efficiency of the tax system 
and increase the burden of taxation. That is, the improvement in the environment (a  30
first dividend) is not likely to be offset by a cheaper way for the government to raise 
taxes (which would give a second – non-environmental – dividend). The reason is that 
a switch from taxing labor and capital to taxing pollution narrows the base on which 
the taxes can be levied. Capital and labor income each constitutes a much larger 
fraction of total income than the share of pollution in total cost. As noted above, 
environmental taxation reduces inputs in production and forces firms to spend more 
on pollution control. This reduces output and income in the economy, the tax base 
becomes smaller and the government raises less tax revenue from non-environmental 
taxes. The revenues from environmental taxes are insufficient to make up for the loss 
of revenues from non-environmental taxes.  
In practice, the replacement of non-environmental taxes by revenue-raising 
environmental taxes may yield a double dividend if the existing tax system is highly 
inefficient along other, non-environmental dimensions (for example if capital is 
excessively taxed relative to labor). In this case, the tax system can be improved even 
without the introduction of environmental taxes, but vested interests or distributional 
concerns may prevent these tax reforms. Results from economic simulation models 
suggest that gains from the combination of environmental taxation and tax reform 
may yield substantial benefits in practice, but not for all groups in society. The major 
challenge is to find out ways to compensate losers from tax reform, without providing 
the wrong incentives. For example, workers and capital owners in polluting industry 
are likely to be hurt by environmental tax reform; but compensating them for losses 
should not reduce their incentive to invest funds and to find alternative employment 
outside the polluting industry.  
 
3. Environmental quality as a source of productivity  31
Environmental regulation has short-run costs but long-run gains. These gains 
arise primarily in terms of a cleaner environment; they take time to materialize since 
the recovery of environmental quality is time consuming. However, as a feedback 
effect, a cleaner environment may improve productivity in the economy, which may 
offset the economic costs. The most obvious example is the effect on productivity in 
sectors that heavily rely on environmental resources. Policies to improve water and air 
quality of certain regions may boost the attractiveness of these regions for tourism or 
residential development. Hence, profits and productivity of tourism and construction 
may rise. Policies aimed at marine resources may also boost fish populations, thus 
improving productivity of the fishery. Forest management may give rise to both 
environmental benefits and improved yields for forestry.  
In general, productivity of sectors or the economy as a whole is measured by 
multi factor productivity, which is a measure of the amount of outputs per unit of 
inputs. The factor productivity of conventional inputs like labor and capital may 
increase if environmental quality improves. Capital equipment and residential 
buildings may depreciate less fast if air pollution is less. The productivity of labor 
may benefit from health improvements that are induced by better environmental 
quality. Less working days are lost if health improves, which increases output per unit 
of input. Health care costs fall, which alleviates private and government budgets. 
Substantial costs can be avoided if climate change is mitigated, like risks of sea level 
rise (which directly affect agriculture, urban areas in coastal regions, and dike 
maintenance costs), and the loss of harvest in agriculture due to draughts or changes 
in precipitation.  
 
  D. Confronting costs and benefits  32
Summarizing the results above, we may state that most empirical research 
suggests that improvements in environmental quality require costly regulation, despite 
the various general equilibrium effects on efficiency and productivity that may 
mitigate the direct costs of regulation. The focus on costs of environmental regulation 
may distract attention from its benefits: these costs are incurred to achieve 
environmental benefits. The costs are worthwhile being incurred if the benefits 
outweigh the costs in a social cost-benefit analysis.  
The social benefits from environmental improvements are often found to be 
large, but they are less visible than the costs of environmental regulation. Measuring 
the benefits requires putting a value on improvements in environmental quality, in 
health, and environmental amenities. When asked in surveys, individuals indicate that 
they are willing to give up large amounts of money and income to pay for these 
improvements. We can also infer individuals’ valuation of environmental amenities 
from the amount of money individuals spend on traveling to locations with 
environmental amenities, or the premium people are willing to pay on houses located 
near them. The numbers from these studies can be used to construct an aggregate 
indicator of the value of environmental improvements, which can then be confronted 
to the cost estimates to undertake a social cost-benefit analysis.  
The problem that the value of environmental amenities is unobservable (that 
there are no market prices) can thus be solved. However, perceptions may still be 
biased. Since neither market transactions nor market prices are associated with 
environmental goods, the current system of national accounts does not include the 
value of environmental goods as it only measures the value of marketed goods. As a 
result, the environmental benefits that environmental policies create are not part of 
national income, and environmental improvements do not count as economic  33
progress. Attempts have been launched to adjust national income figures so as to 
include imputed values of environmental improvements and degradation (see 
Bartelmus’ entry in this Encyclopedia). These “green GDP” figures would more 
appropriately measure well-being and progress than current GDP figures do. As long 
as these adjustments are not standard, there seems to be a trade-off between 
environment and growth, while once we take into account the value of environment 
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